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CASE NOTES

FEDERAL INCOME TAX-Subchapter S Corporations-Stockholders as Corporate Employees-The Deductibility of Food and Lodging. Wilhelm
v. United States, 257 F. Supp. 16 (D. Wyo. 1966).

Prior to 1960, W. E. Dover and Ruby K. Dover owned
ranch lands in Platte and Albany Counties in Wyoming. The
lands in Platte County consisted of two units, the Home
Place, where the Dovers lived, and the Brush Creek Ranch.
Early in 1960, the Dovers gave nearly 2,000 acres of the Brush
Creek Ranch to their daughter and son-in-law, the Wilhelms,
who shortly thereafter moved onto the ranch and into a
$27,000 house built for them by the Dovers. Later in 1960,
the livestock and equipment owned by the Dovers and Wilhelms, along with the land and buildings, were transferred
to a newly formed corporation, the "Thirty-One Bar Ranch
Company." All common shares were owned by the Dovers
and Wilhelms. Also on the day of incorporation an election
was filed by the corporation electing to have its income
taxed directly to its shareholders under Subchapter S.1
The taxpayers duly filed their 1961 Federal income tax
returns, reporting cash salaries received from the corporation
and deducting their respective shares of the net operating
loss incurred by the corporation in 1961. The corporation's
1961 Federal income tax return was audited but the Government disallowed amounts deducted for the food and lodging
(in the form of depreciation on the Home Place and Brush
Creek residences) furnished by the corporation to its shareholder-employees. In the ensuing action the court, in addition to sustaining the deductibility of the food and lodging by
the ranch corporation, also held that these same amounts
were excludible from the gross income of the shareholderemployees under the provisions of section 119 Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The government was not authorized to
appeal the case by the Solicitor General of the United States,2
even though the significance of the holding, if allowed to
stand, is patently obvious.
A contrary result could have been reached, had the
court adopted any one of four arguments relied on by the
Government. Therefore, an analysis of the case can best
1.

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(a).
TAX SFmv. %56,344.

2. 6 P-H 1967 FED.
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be accomplished by considering the court's response to the
Government's main contentions.
First, the Government argued that the effect of an election under Subchapter S is to convert the corporation into
a partnership, thereby making the shareholders, in effect,
partners.' Since a partnership has no legal existence in'dependent from the individual partners, the partners and the
partnership are one and the same legal entity, hence under
the taxing statute a member of a partnership cannot be an
employee thereof.' The Government therefore contended that
the provisions under section 119, which apply only to employees, should not be available to the petitioners. No authority was cited by the Government to support its original
premise that an election under section 1372 converted the
corporation into a partnership and the stockholders into
partners. The court in Wilhelm was unable to agree with
this contention after having reviewed the legislative history
pertaining to Subchapter S ui/der sections 1371-1377.
The Subchapter S sections became a part of the 1954
Internal Revenue Code by virtue of the Technical Amendments Act of 1958.' Nothing in the Act, or in the Senate
Finance Committee Reports indicates an intent to treat
a corporation electing under section 1372 as a partnership."
The express purpose of the Subchapter S section was to
"eliminate the influence of the Federal income tax in the
selection of the form of business organization which may
be most desirable under the circumstances."' Also, according
to the Regulations,' the effect of a valid election by the
corporation is merely to subject the shareholders to the
provisions of section 1373 (providing for the taxation of
the corporation's undistributed taxable income to the shareholders). There appears to be nothing in the legislative his3. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1371 for a definition of who may elect the
special tax treatment, and § 1372 as to how the election is made and its
consequent effect.
4. Commissioner v. Doak, 234 F.2d 704 (4th Cir. 1956), see also Wilson v.
United States, 19 AM. FED. TAx REP,2d 1225 (1967).
5. 72 Stat. 1606 (1958); See the governing principles underlying the Technical
Amendments Act of 1958 as set forth in the Senate and House Reports
collected in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4876-78, 5005-14.
6. Id.
7. SENATE FINANCE COMM. REPORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 8300, 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4752.
8. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-1(b) (2) (1959).
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tory of Subchapter S, nor in the Internal Revenue Code, nor
in the Treasury Regulations, which would support the Government's contention. Although the existence of the argument
was recognized as early as 1960, leading writers in the field
of income tax had no trouble refuting both the premises
underlying the argument and therefore, the argument itself.'
The court in Wilhelm was obviously correct in refusing to
regard the Subchapter S election as effectively converting
a corporation into a partnership.
Closely related to the Government's first contention, but
yet something different is the concept of piercing the corporate tax veil. "When a sham or device is resorted to for
the purpose of distorting the true situation the resulting
smoke screen will be pierced to ascertain the truth."" The
Government in the Wilhelm case argued that the corporate
form of the Thirty-One Bar Ranch should be disregarded
because the Dovers and the Wilhelms were the corporation
and could not be its employees. A leading text in the field
of income tax" recognizes that there have been instances
where the courts have disregarded the corporate entity and
have looked to the stockholders themselves as the real parties
in interest. Generally this has been done when:
1) the corporation is a mere agent for the stockholder.
2) the business of the corporation is so intermingled
with the stockholder as to constitute a single
business enterprise.
3) in cases of tax evasion, fraud, sham and other
9. Caplin, Subchapter S v.Partnership,46 VA. L. REv. 61 (1960). The author,
who was later to become Commissioner of Internal Revenue, stated categorically that in his opinion Subchapter S corporations and their employeestockholders qualify for all fringe benefits available to employees of
"regular" corporations. His list included:
Deferred compensation plans § 401-404;
Accident and Health Plans § 105;
Group Term Life Insurance Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (2) (1957);
Employee Death Benefits § 101(b);
Restricted Stock Options § 421;
Convenience of Employer Rules § 119.
See also Landis, Advantages and Disadvantages of the Subchapter S Election, 18 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAXATION 723 (1960).
10. Adams Bros. v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 501, 505 (8th Cir. 1955).
11. See 7 J. MERTENs, LAw Op FEDERAL INCOME TAX, § 38.04-.15 (1956) and the
cases collected therein.
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non-bona fide transactions involving no real business purpose. 2
However, the discussion in the text also recognizes that a
taxpayer has the right to avoid or decrease his tax liability
by methods permitted by law.
Some courts have gone so far as to list up to twenty-eight
factors which, if present, may give rise to the inference that
the corporation is not separate and distinct from its shareholders. 3 Normally, a Subchapter S corporation is not a
pseudo corporation per se; it is a real corporation, for all
corporate purposes, which has simply elected to be subject
to Federal income tax in a special way." The Government
had to admit as much in support of its first argument because only "domestic corporations" can make the Subchapter
S election."
No comprehensive generalizations can be made and whether the entity will be disregarded depends on the factors
existing in each case."0 The court in Wilhelm after an examination of both the record and the very few facts introduced by
the Govermnent concluded that "the Thirty-One Bar Ranch
Co. was incorporated according to the law and in good
faith. The corporation alone conducted the taxpayer's ranching operations. It was a separate and distinct corporate
and taxable entity."" The court recognized that the inference
that the taxpayers might have been motivated by tax considerations is unimportant, so long as they did what the
law permits, 8 and that the determination of tax liability is
not necessarily influenced by the taxpayers complete stock
ownership and control.'
Since the Government failed to
introduce evidence to support its argument that the cor12. Id. at 38.08, 38.12.
13. Haberman Farms, Inc. v. United States, 305 F.2d 787 (8th Cir. 1962). The
test used by this court was that the corporate entity should be disregarded
if the corporate form is no more than the alter ego of the taxpayer, a form
which may have a distinct tax purpose, but with no reality beyond lessening
the tax burden.
14. Patty, Qualification and Disqualification Under Subchapter S, 18 N.Y.U.
INST. ON FED. TAXATION 661 (1960).
15. INT. Rsv. CODE OF 1954, § 1371 (a).
16. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934).
17. Wilhelm v. United States, 257 F.Supp. 16 (D. Wyo. 1966).
18. Here the court cited Cravens v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 895 (10th Cir.
1959) in support of its statement.
19. Cf. Skarda v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1957); Noland v.
Commissioner, 269 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1959).
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porate entity should be disregarded, the court saw no reason
to treat the Thirty-One Bar Ranch as a partnership or the
Dovers and Wilhelms as partners.
The Government's third principal argument was based
on section 316 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The
taxpayer's living expenses paid by the corporation were
contended to be nothing more than a constructive 'dividend.20
However, unless a distribution is made to the taxpayer, or
for his benefit, it may not be regarded as either a dividend
or the legal equivalent of a dividend.2 ' The use of corporate
property for personal pleasure,2 2 or payments made merely
because the recipients were the owners of the corporation2 3
have been treated as dividend distributions. The court in
Wilhelm, however, held that the food and lodging were provided for the benefit of the corporation, not the taxpayer.
The court also held that the taxpayers derived no personal
pleasure from the use of corporate property, and that food
and lodging were supplied to all corporate employees regardless of stock ownership. Even more detrimental, conceptually,
to the Government's constructive dividend argument was its
willingness to concede that the food and lodging were properly deductible by the ranch corporation as business expenses
under section 162(a) and section 167(a). It is difficult
to grasp how the amounts involved are transmuted from an
ordinary and necessary expense24 of carrying on the business
of the ranch corporation into constructive dividends in the
hands of the taxpayer-employees. Never have dividends paid
by a corporation to its stockholders been considered an
ordinary and necessary business expense.2"
The Government's fourth principal contention was predicated on the most basic definition in income tax law: Income
means all income from whatever source derived.2" Income
may be realized therefore in the form of services, meals, accommodations ... as well as in cash,27 hence there can be no
20.

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 316(a).

21.
22.
23.
24.

Holsey v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 865 (3rd Cir. 1958).
W. D. Gale, Inc. v. Commissioner, 297 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1961).
Louisville Chair Co. v. United States, 296 F.2d 621 (6th Cir. 1961).
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) reads in part: "There shall be allowed
as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business."

25.

See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 161-62.

26. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61.
27. Treas. Regs. § 1.161-1 (a) (1958)

(Emphasis supplied).
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question but that the value of food and lodging furnished
to the taxpayers would fall within this statutory definition
of gross income,28 absent any exclusion to the contrary. But
section 119 of the Internal Revenue Code introduced and
relied on by the taxpayer does exclude such income, at least
in specific instances:
There shall be excluded from gross income of
an employee the value of any meals or lodging furnished to him by his employer for the convenience
of the employer, but only if(1) in the case of meals, the meals are furnished
on the business premises of the employer or,
(2) in the case of lodging, the employee is
required to accept such lodging on the business premises of his employer as a condition
of employment.2 9
This provision was designed to end the confusion as to the
tax status of meals and lodging furnished to an employee
by his employer." The application of the three basic tests
embodied in this section to the facts of a specific case has
caused considerable difficulty. The Government in the
Wilhelm case made a blanket allegation that the taxpayers
were not within the provisions of section 119, but it failed
to show which of the tests, if any, were not met. The court
in Wilhelm, anticipating questions that could have been
raised more specifically by the Government discussed each
of the three tests in turn.
Whether the meals and lodging were furnished on the
business premises is the first test that has to be met in applying the exclusionary :section, section 119. Meals furnished
to a cowhand while heiding his employer's cattle on leased
lands or on national forest lands used under a permit would
be regarded as having been furnished on the business premises for purposes of section 119."' In a recent case involving
highway patrolmen, the business premises for purposes of
section 119 were held to include all highways within the
state."2 These sources illustrate the broad scope of the busi28.
29.
30.
31.
82.

Note 26 eupra.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 119.
SENATE FINANCE COMM. REPORT, supra note 7 at 4042.
H. CONF. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
United States v. Morelan, 356 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966).
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ness premises rule. In Wilhelm the court correctly concluded
that no reasonable dispute could arise as to whether the meals
alld lodging were furnished on the ranch-employer's business
premises.
The second test embodied in the phrase, "required as a
condition of employment," means required in order for the
employee to perform properly the duties of his employment."
There is no requirement that the employee be deprived of
his free choice in lodging or boarding, nor is it essential that
the employee be under an express requirement by the employer to accept the lodging furnished. It is enough to
satisfy the requirements of section 119(2) that the exigencies
of the situation, as a practical matter, require the employee
to accept the lodging furnishdd.34 The intention of the employer (with respect to food and lodging being furnished as
a compensation) is not particularly important and an objective test is to be applied in determining whether the employee
is required to accept lodging on the business premises as a
condition of employment." The burden of proof is on the
taxpayer, and for instance, even though the minutes of a
directors meeting expressly provide that the employee of
the corporation must accept lodging furnished to him as a
condition of his employment, such an agreement is not conclusive." In another recent case, the principal stockholder
and his sister (also a stockholder) were not allowed to exclude
the value of lodging furnished to them by the controlled
corporation. 7 The court indicated that since the taxpayer's
job did not require his full time presence at the business
site and that since he could have lived in one of two towns,
each ten miles away, the lodging was not accepted as a
condition of employment. In Wilhelm the court apparently
felt the objective test and the burden of proof had been
successfully met by the taxpayers. Because no other housing
and boarding facilities were available to the ranch employees
and because they had no other choice but to accept the
33. Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(b) (1964).
61,156, at 61,853 (1961).
34. Manuel G. Setal, 30 P-H TAX CT. MEM.
35. United States Junior Chamber of Commerce v. United States, 334 F.2d 660
(Ct. Cl. 1964).
66,196, at 66,1127 (1966),
36. Lloyd E. Peterson, 35 P-H TAX CT. MEM.
wherein it was said, "It seems quite unlikely that the president of this
would be required to
had
voting
control,
since
he
particularly
company,
live on the company property had he desired to live elsewhere."
87. Mary B. Heyward, 36 T.C. 739 (1961), aff'd. 301 F.2d 307 (4th Cir. 1962).
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facilities furnished by the corporate employer, the taxpayers
had according to the court, "made it abundantly clear that
the food and lodging were accepted as a condition of employment. ',38
The third test as to whether meals are furnished for
the convenience of the employer is one of fact to be determined
by an analysis of all the facts and circumstances in each
case." The Wilhelms managed a grass ranch which, as their
evidence showed, required constant attention by experienced
personnel. The cattle on a grass ranch must constantly be
protected from the natural elements, weather, straying, and
thievery. The nearest town, Wheatland, is 24 miles away
by a road which is exceedingly difficult to travel during
foul weather. The presence of the taxpayer-employees was
held to be indispensible by the court and therefore, for the
convenience of the employer. Two very recent cases lend
support to the Wilhelm court's conclusion regarding the
convenience of the employer test. The rental value of a bunkhouse and amounts spent for food were claimed to be excludible by an Oklahoma rancher. The amounts were disallowed
by the Internal Revenue Service because the taxpayer was
a partner in the ranch operation; but the implication remained
that had the ranch been incorporated, the deductions would
have been allowed.40 The other case involved an incorporated
poultry farm and the facts were similar to those in Wilhelm.
It was held that food and lddging furnished by the corporation were includible in the taxpayer-shareholder's income
because the taxpayer could have lived in town a short distance
away." The remaining implication here was that had the
ranch been located a substantial distance from town (as in
Wilhelm) the amounts could have been excluded under
section 119.
CONCLUSION

Generally income tax deductions for personal, family
or living expenses are not allowed."' The taxpayers in Wil38. Wilhelm v. United States, supra note 17.
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(a)(1) (1964).
40. Wilson v. United States, 19 AM. FED. TAX REP. 2d 1225 (1967). Accord,
Commissioner v. Doak, 234 F.2d 704 (1956).
41. Lloyd E. Peterson, supra note 36.
42. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 262. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b) (3) (1958)
for a specific enumeration.
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helm have managed to circumvent this general principle by
availing themselves of several other Code provisions. In
essence, they have deducted personal, family, and living
expenses, because such a deduction from the Subchapter S
corporation's income is, effectively, a deduction from the
shareholder-employee's income. Although, on first impression, it might appear that Wilhelm is contrary to the spirit
of our taxing laws, the validity of the underlying principle
has been indirectly recognized by the Internal Revenue Service. Revenue Ruling 63-32" provides that a partnership
which had elected to be taxed as a corporation, under section
1361 of the Code, might deduct the cost of meals and lodging
furnished to a partner-employee on its business premises,
and the partner-employee might exclude the value of such
meals and lodging from his gross income, providing that
the partnership and the partner-employee have met all the
tests set forth in section 162 (Business Deductions) and
section 119 of the 1954 Code. Extending this ruling to include corporations electing to be taxed as a partnership
under section 1371 in addition to partnerships electing to be
taxed as corporations under section 1361, would be a short
step indeed. The fact that the Government failed to appeal
in Wilhelm" does not necessarily mean that the decision will
be followed. The Commissioner may be awaiting a slightly
more favorable set of facts, the state of the record after
trial may not have been entirely advantageous or, perhaps
other reasons not involving the merits of the case have influenced the decision. A taxpayer with a case similar to Wilhelm must be prepared for possible litigation with the Internal Revenue Service.
In 1959, shortly after it became apparent that extensive
fringe benefits would be available to the shareholder-employees of a Subchapter S corporation, Chairman Wilbur
Mills introduced a bill in his House Ways and Means Committee which provided that those owning more than 5% of
a section 1371 corporation's outstanding stock, quote, "would
not be considered employees for purpose of the fringe benefit
provisions.''" The bill however, was never reported out
43. 1963-1 CuM. BuLL. 146.
44. Note 2 supra.
45. H. R. 9003, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
53 VA. L. REv. 1161 (1967).

See Cohen, Subchapter S in 1967,
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of committee and during the succeeding years fringe benefits
have continued to be available to shareholder-employees.
Dicta in other cases," Revenue Ruling 63-32, and legislative
inaction since the Mills bill add considerable weight to the
decision in Wilhelm. If, in the future, a similar case arises,
the principles developed in Wilhelm signal a like resultabsent a future Revenue Ruling or Congressional Act to
the contrary.
SAMUEL E. WING
46. Particularly Commissioner v. Doak, note 4 supra; Lloyd E. Peterson, note
36 supra; Mary B. Heyward, note 37 supra.
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